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Governmental and public opinion attitudes in the Arab world towards the Middle East peace process; some perceptions of a European role (by Gerben Meihuizen, the Hague, September 2001 ) Of all the countries directly involved in the Middle East conflict SYRIA stands by now alone in seeing not even the beginning of an Israeli withdrawal from its territory, finding itself still in a state of war with its jewish neighbour. Syria's involvement in the Middle East conflict is not confined to the issue of the occupied Golan Heights. For historical, strategic an ideological reasons, Syria under Ba'th party rule has been projecting itself as the staunchest champion of the Arab cause versus Zionism, also claiming to act on behalf of other Arab parties concerned, including the Palestinians. Ba'th ideology considers the state of Israel not only as a bulwark of Western domination but sees also the Hebrew state as a racist construction based on an erroneous notion of religion, incompatible with the party's secular doctrine. Being deprived of many resources of its own, this country needed to turn for support to a variety of states, not necessarily with the same programme as Syria itself and moreover at odds amongst themselves, as the Soviet Union, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The collapse of the Soviet Union costed Syria dearly and the Middle East problem ceased to be an element of the cold war. Syria moved gradually away from its stand of absolute rejection of any settlement with Israel to advocating an honorable peace. Links were reestablished with Cairo and further adjustment of Syria's policy occurred as a consequence of the Gulf crisis, in which Damascus opted, although not without reservations, to rally to the side of the American led coalition agaist Iraq, its traditional rival, staying immune to Saddam's attempts to channel all arab forces against Israel. This chain of events paved the way to the holding of the Madrid peace conference with Syria participating and negotiating with Israel, but remaining absent in the MENA multilateral track. The Oslo agreement followed by Jordanian- Israeli peace shattered Syria's original purpose to attain a comprehensive arrangement through a coordinated Arab negotiating strategy.The perception arose that Israel in dealing with the Syrians was above all trying to bear pressure on the Palestinians. The reinforcement of links between Ankara and Tel Aviv made Damascus wary of a new form of strategical encirclement. It needed to keep leaning on its position in Lebanon, but when Barak decided to a unilateral pull-out from the south of this country. Syria lost part of its means to pressure Israel. After the death of President Hafez el Asad and his succession by his son Bashar, chances of a diplomatic break through look still very dim, certainly with Sharon in power. The new Syrian President appears to be aware of his country needing economic and political reforms. Until he has consolidated his own position, Dr. Bashar can hardly afford to deviate from the parameters set out by his father in dealing with Israel. Full recovery of the Golan (i.e.till the june 1967 line) remains a conditio sine qua non for Damascus. It can be noted that the demarcation line on the Golan has remained respected from 1973 up till now. A more comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians would leave Syria practically alone in facing Israel. This might only strengthen Syria's ties with Iran and also make moves to further normalisation with Iraq more likely. An extra pillar of Syria's foreign policy remains its axis with Egypt and Saudi-Arabia and- be it to a lesser extent its partnership in the Damascus Declaration, which while not having proven its value towards promoting security in the Gulf, lends to Damascus at least an extra diplomatic weight in handling the peace process. Syria moreover still harbours an assembly of Palestinian groups, dissenting with Arafat's policy and remains in contact with Hezbollah. Mobilizing public opinion on behalf of the struggle against Zionism has also been serving the Ba'th government policy of fostering national cohesion around a generally felt moral, less controversial issue than other ,more domestic, themes. Occasionaly it has seen itself confronted with voices of public opinion favouring more radical options to be chosen against Israel. The only significant opposition to the Ba'th government used to be the Muslim Brother movement, which was practically crushed in the early 1980's. A political regime of such leanings would most likely act in a less pragmatic manner than has been the case under Al Asad. Saddam's actions against Israel during the Gulf war enjoyed large sympathy under the Syrian public and did not facilitate the governments manoevering to take- and justify -its stand in this conflict. Peace with Israel, even in the case of complete recovery of the Golan, will not be easy to digest to Syria. It will deprive the government of a central rallying point of popular support. The country moreover may feel itself too weak to be able to confront to what is perceived as a threat of economic expansionism in the Levant region, as was demonstrated by the distrust displayed by Damascus towards the Peres' plans for an Middle East economic zone. Also Syria will not easily give up its special relationship with LEBANON, which government, bound to coordinate its policy with Damascus, is less in a position to strike a separate peace-deal with Israel. As a matter of fact Lebanon has a specific interest in a permanent settlement, if only because of the massive presence of Palestinian refugees on its soil, which are difficult to integrate given the precarious relationship between its own confessional-ethnic groups, and thus remaining an extra burden. Moreover this country remains extremely vulnerable to renewed outbursts of hostility, generated by Hezbollah actions against the still Israeli held Sheba farms, even if Israel would confine its reaction to Syrian aims. Hezbollah has meanwhile proven to be capable of political integration within the Lebanese context. Still this Shia movement will probably stick to its own agenda, not necessarily in line with Damascus, nor even entirely with Teheran. Opposition, not only by Maronites, against Syria's presence in Lebanon has been on the increase and Syrian forces have been partly been redeployed. A withdrawal by Syria may not necessarily entail stability to Lebanon, particularly in the absence of peace with Israel, while militant Palestinian and radical Shi'ite elements remain active on its territory. Lebanon needs above all rest to realize its process of reconstruction, to which end it depends to an important extent on foreign, and especially EU-aid. JORDAN, although since 1994 formally at peace with Israel, keeps not less an interest of its own in a wider settlement; also in this country there is a huge presence of Palestinians. Although these are relatively well integrated in local society, there remains a risk of further demographic pressure, depending on events on the West bank.The course of the renewed intifadah cannot but affect Jordan, as a country still conscious of its historical links with the West bank, despite its break in 1988 of administrative arrangements with this part of Palestine.The peace-treaty with Israel provided for a Jordanian role in the supervision of holy Muslim shrines in Jerusalem (although Amman later convened with Arafat to give this up when East- Jerusalem would become capital of a Palestinian state). Even when there existed already before this treaty a form of de-facto peace, its formalisation did not produce a warm relationship with Tel Aviv. King Abdallah still fresh in power,can be expected to pursue in broad lines his late father's policy. His country , weak in proper resources, remains very dependent upon foreign assistance and is practically sandwiched by stronger neighbours, with all of which occasionally tensions used to flare up. Jordanian sympathy during the Gulf crisis with Iraq costed the country dearly, causing political isolation and a rift with Arab Gulf states, which by now has been overcome.Popular feelings are strongly siding both with the plight of the Palestinians under occupation and of the Iraqi people. Islamist opposition remains vocal and cannnot be easily dismissed, in spite of a fair degree of integration in the domestic scene.The Jordanian leadership can anyhow not be indifferent to the future of Palestine and a high degree of cooperation between the Hashemite kingdom and a Palestinian state looks only logical, although more institutional links, be it federal or confederal, as envisaged in the 1980's will be probably more of a burden than of real benefit to Amman. EGYPT's peace with Israel, established since Camp David, looks solid enough, but has also been remaining lukewarm, and chilling again after the appearance of a new intifadah, followed by Sharon's coming into office. Domestic opinion, particularly from Islamist quarters, remains opposed to a normal relationship with Israel, although the Islamist threat to the Egyptian regime seems not to be acute anymore. In view of its leading role in the Arab world, serving as the center of the Arab League, Cairo is not in a position to sit on the sideline of any dealings with still remaining issues of the Middle East problem. It would hope for an extension of its own peace to other Arab parties, in order to solidify its own position. This stand gave it a major stake in the Madrid peace process. Often together with Jordan it tries to be instrumental in conjuring the dangers of further Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. In building bridges Cairo can count on a set of reasonably good relationships with practically all sides involved. It remains in close contact with both Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well with the minor Gulf states, that had been underwriting the Damascus-declaration of 1991. IRAQ being ruled by an Arab nationalist Ba'th regime considers itself strongly committed to the Palestinian cause and used to reject any form of accommodation with the Jewish state. Baghdad always maintained a solid relationship with Arafat and his following. Still its involvement in the Middle East question has been more of a rather indirect nature and its actions were often meant to discredit its Ba'thist rival in Damascus, who sees itself condemned to a more pragmatic posture. The waging of two successive wars in the Gulf area has marginalised Baghdad's role in the Middle East conflict. Saddam's attempt to link this conflict to the Gulf crisis turned out to be in vain, and the outcome of this crisis facilitated the convening of the Madrid peace conference. Priority to Baghdad is nowadays the lifting of the UN sanctions regime and the restoration of its authority over Kurdistan. Only then could this country, rich in resources, regain its natural weight, including its capacity to let itself felt in the Mashreq. The six member states of the GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL may feel less directly affected by the Middle East question. Their rulers nurture a strong concern for stability in their immediate surroundings, which they saw above all threatened by Iran and later on by Iraq. Still they share with their populations a great deal of compassion with the Palestinian cause, inspired largely by feelings of muslim solidarity and concern for the islamic holy places in Jerusalem.Their relations with the PLO suffered as a consequence of its stand during the Gulf crisis. The GCC was represented at the Madrid conference, its members joining in the ensuing multilateral talks. They even agreed to the lifting of secundary and tertiary sanctions against Israel. A few states, like Oman and Qatar, even went as far as opening up diplomatically towards Israel. All these signs of a beginning détente between Israel and Gulf states have however been fading again away as a consequence of the recent turn of events in Israel and the occupied territories. This stirred up again popular emotions which, as well sympathetic to the suffering of the Iraqi people, see constantly double standards to be applied by the West. Goverments cannot easily overlook this mood, often combined with demands for political reforms and apt to be exploited by radical muslim elements who question the order prevailing in these countries. Efforts to render GCC cooperation more substantial have been slow moving, although the GCC is up till now the best example of interarab regional integration. To protect their security its member states are still mainly dependent upon Western, especially American support. There is an awareness felt in these states that US strategical requirements do not always run parallel to their own interests. With the EU, the GCC is involved since 1988 in an ongoing dialogue, aiming at cooperation in a variety of fields and the establishment of a common trade area. In the MAGHREB countries of North Africa , although remote from the focus of the Middle East conflict, popular sentiment is strongly on the side of the palestinians. An anti- Israeli mood in these countries is, although less marked than in the Mashreq, both of an Islamic and Arab nationalist colouring, associating the Palestinian resistance with their own experience of being occupied. This mood appears sometimes at odds with official policy: at an early stage there were already informal contacts between Rabat and Tel Aviv; Premier Peres met King Hassan in 1986. Both Morocco and Tunesia entered into a low level official relationship with Israel (meanwhile frozen again). President Bouteflika met Barak during the funeral of King Hassan, but did not make the step towards relations with Israel. Governments in the Maghreb see themselves often more concerned with events at their own doorsteps, such as the Algerian crisis and the Western Sahara question. Efforts to set up a sound form of cooperation in the framework of the "Great Maghreb Union" including also Lybia and Mauretania, have still been rather unproductive. Orientation in this region is in many respects more directed towards Europe. The situation in Algeria and the Maghreb as a whole led to the forging of a EURO-MEDITERRANEAN partnership at Barcelona in 1995, joining the EU member-states with a dozen of mediterranean countries and including Israel, the Palestine Authority and Jordan. EMP serves as a platform for cooperation on a broad range of issues covering both economic-financial and political-security aspects. A major purpose is trade liberalisation between its members. Progress in this field is slow moving. An ambitious EU-programme of aiding south- and east mediterranean recipients is suffering from, often bureaucratic, problems. Through this channel EU is acting as the biggest donor to the occupied territories and also a country like Syria receives support to modernize its economy. Although at first not meant to be part of the Barcelona agenda, the Middle East problem gradually became a topic of discussion. It was felt that complete stability in the Mediterranean is not feasible without more progress in the Middle East question. This notion has however proven to be of a burden and even threatening to form, since the stagnation of the peace-process, a kind of mortgage on the security-talks within this forum, which was not long ago the only meeting place of Middle East countries still formally at war with each other. Lack of cohesion between the non EU-partners in this process is an additional handicap and the EU-role looks to become limited to the economic sphere, leaving matters of a more political interest, such as relating to the peace process, in the hands of the US. Concluding remarks Apparently peace with Israel can rather easier be concluded by governments of an autoritarian nature than if their countries would be more democratically ruled. Still the impact of public opinion in the Arab world should not be underestimated. The Arab public is increasingly exposed to modern, national border crossing, means of information and communication as internet and sattelite TV such as the outspoken Al Jazeera station. This not only can result in more public involvement in interarab causes, but likewise a strenghtening of arab solidarity on the public level and a stronger felt need for more political freedom and transparency of government. Unpopular policies in dealing with issues as the Middle East problem can in combination with discontent on more domestic themes put an Arab regime's existence at risk, be in more "progressive" or "conservative" countries. Public attitudes are shaped by a variety of factors, ranging from religious feelings to more secular- nationalist motives, although generally speaking both dimensions can easily combine. Arab governments often competing for panarab or regional leadership with each other show a tendency to exploit public sentiment dissenting with rival regimes to their own interest, thus making the Middle East conflict with Israel more than often an interarab bone of contention. Lack of interstate cohesion on the Arab side is also an impediment in relation to the European Union. This is notable within the context of the Barcelona process.(The GCC,although enjoying a high degree of cohesion, is less relevant to Europe's role in the peace process). Towards Europe and its role in the Middle East problem, mixed feelings prevail in Arab capitals. Countries as Great Britain and France are still sometimes held responsible for the historical origins of the problems of the Middle East. Because of this reason, but not less out of a sense of more affinity with Europe and trust in more understanding from that side, more involvement by EU is hoped for. Frustration is repeatedly caused by the opaque aspects of EU decision making : the dual mechanics of policy, ever shifting Presidencies and-Troika's with constantly switching attitudes and weak mandates, cumbersome consensus-building. There exists a tendency of overrating Europe's potential in this respect, combined with misperceptions of how European integration is moving forward. Additional concern is evidently created by the forthcoming enlargement of the Union. Yet the process of European integration is frequently favorably compared with the less successful story of arab unity and there is a considerable perception in the Arab world viewing the European Union as a natural partner for cooperation in general, and as a facilitator -if not mediator- in the Middle East peace process. VI - Options for a European policy for the Middle East |