Background Paper by Dr. Peter Idenburg

International Dialogues Foundation

This paper is a background paper that was written together with a number of other background papers in the context of the project "A Role for Europe in the Middle East" which was initiated by International Dialogues Foundation in conjunction with Institute Clingendael. In this updated version it serves as a background paper for the Public Discussion on the same subject on 14 June 2002 in Amsterdam .

The question of the potential role of the European Union in finding a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be preceded by the question of the position of the EU in the international political system. Of course in final analysis it are the parties that are directly involved, Israel and Palestine, on whose decisions the outcome will depend. The effects of the efforts by third parties to influence the conflicting parties need an analysis of the structure from which the parties - those that want to influence and those that have to be influenced - derive their position. As we are living since 11 September 2001 in a period of important structural changes in the international political system, we will focus in our analysis on the question in how far these structural changes are relevant for the role conception of the EU.

In our opinion it makes sense to make a distinction for the analysis between the different levels, such as the global, regional and national levels. And further in accordance with the general methodological principle to start with the highest level: the global level. This means that the lower levels are viewed primarily from the perspective of the global level.

At present the international or global political system can be characterised as tending to a mono-centric system, with the US as its uncontested centre. The events of 11 September 2001 seem to have strengthened this tendency, and more particularly with regard to the US role conception that corresponds with it. This conception has as a characteristic the identification of the vital interests of the US with the vital interests of the international system as a whole. And what is more: since this central role of the US is not imaginary, but based on a real military and technological superiority, other actors will consider a perceived threat to the vital interests of the US as a threat to the vital interests of the international system as whole and therefore also to their own vital interests. This might serve as an explanation for a certain docility of the EU towards the US in matters like the Middle East conflict.

In a system with a dominant centre, the internal power relations of this centre tend to dominate the system as a whole. Those factors that are determinant for the position of its central decision maker, can be of decisive influence on his foreign policy decisions. Concrete: the policy decisions by President Bush on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are highly influenced by the opinions and attitudes of those who have to decide about his position at home, for instance about his re-election. This of course is no news. The problem however is that as the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is in practice supported by the US this happens as a provocation against the opinion that is almost universally shared and against the very principles of the international legal order. Thus a specific moral and legal problem on the level of the relations between two nations becomes a problem of universal dimensions.

Since it is clear that efforts from outside to influence the internal decision making process in the US most probably will work counterproductive, the question rises what other possibilities are available for influencing from outside. More specifically the question should be whether the present situation provides room for international coalitions to create a counterweight to policies of the dominant power that are contrary to the basic moral and legal principles of the international system as a whole. This may seem strange for those who are accustomed to the fixed codes of conduct between allies that are derived from the bipolar cold war system. However from a historic perspective the phenomenon of a countervailing coalition versus the monopolistic inclinations of the dominant power can be considered as one of the fundamental and generally accepted rules to safeguard the international political system. For those Europeans who still might not be convinced: it is the present US foreign policy itself that points into this direction.

After the 11th of September certain patterns of behaviour can be observed. Starting with Afghanistan the American foreign policy has shown certain characteristic features: the most obvious being the tendency to unilateralism. The second feature, which can be considered as complementary to the first, is the policy of changing coalitions depending on the requirements of the specific situation. The third characteristic that only underlines these tendencies is the new interpretation of NATO from an institution based on the idea of Atlantic Partnership to an institution that will be instrumental to the US led global strategy, with Europe and Russia as partners. In this way unintentionally new room is being created for those actors that traditionally are close allies of the US to establish coalitions of (constructive-)critical allies when they feel that the principles of the international moral and legal order are threatened by certain aspects of the US foreign policy.

In order to avoid misunderstanding: the logic of the system implies that the constructive criticism is a criticism which accepts the leading role of the US as the custodian of the international political system. It will therefore also accept by implication its major strategic objectives, including the fight against terrorism. But on the sole condition that they are based on the respect of the international legal order and its institutions. It will be only on this condition a broad international support can be expected for a policy that can solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is from this perspective that in our judgement the European Union should commit itself to a much more pronounced policy within the international arena aiming at the creation of the broadest possible international coalition. This coalition should present an overall plan for a just and lasting solution to the conflicting parties. An essential element for its realisation would be the establishment of a US led peacekeeping force on a mandate of the Security Council. One can expect that the Israeli government will not like such an international presence on the territory which it considers to fall under its own jurisdiction. Against this can be argued that this force will not be stationed in Israel, but in the occupied area where its jurisdiction is contested. But what is more: it would be a misunderstanding that such a presence would one-sidedly benefit the Palestinians. In our opinion this peace keeping force will serve no less the Israeli interests, because it seems the only manner to bring under control the Palestinian terrorist actions, in such a way that it will be acceptable for the international community, and to mobilise European support for this element of an international coalition to fight terrorism.

In our opinion the natural partners for the EU in this policy of international coalition building are the Arab countries. This should be a relationship in its own right. Particularly in sensitive questions like that of terrorism one might wonder whether the existing institutions like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and NATO- new style provide the right framework. One should not forget that the problems of terrorism in so far they are associated with Islam are in the first place problems that concern the Muslim society itself, for which it should find its own solution. The European countries with their large Muslim minorities are confronted with a similar challenge. Forums that include Israel ( we are not talking about Jews ) or where the discussion is dominated by the post-11 September strategic conceptions of the US do not seem the right place for this type of Euro-Arab dialogue.

This dialogue does not need to be limited to questions like terrorism. Also the other major issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the refugee question and the establishment of an independent viable Palestinian state are to be taken into consideration. In our opinion it is particularly on these issues that the EU should play a leading role. Here also cooperation with the Arab countries will be very important. Not only because of the considerable financial consequences that will require a sharing of the burden, but also because these are issues of which the regional impact is so obvious that only with their political support workable solutions can be expected. No need to say that this dialogue should not exclude the dialogue in the other forums that were mentioned before. On the contrary a logical consequence of this bilateral extension is a further extension or at least deepening of the EU-Israeli dialogue, because a growing feeling of becoming isolated will only further hamper the efforts to find a solution for this problem.

The Hague, June 2002